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This paper examines whether the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus 
compensation contracts is associated with earnings management. From a sample of 
FTSE350 Index firms over the period of 2005-2014, we investigate the relationship 
between earnings management, through discretionary accruals and real activities 
management, and (1) the use of and extent of reliance on financial and non-financial 
performance measures in CEO bonus contracts; and (2) the use of long-term and short-
term measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find less income-increasing manipulation 
through discretionary accruals and expenses when non-financial performance 
measures (NFPMs) are used alongside financial performance measures (FPMs) and 
when the NFPMs are used to a larger extent than FPMs. Furthermore, we find less 
discretionary accruals when long-term performance measures are used. This implies 
that non-financial and long-term measures encourage executives to work towards the 
long-term success of the company rather than their own short-term reward.    
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There has been much criticism, both in the UK and globally, that executive 
compensation is not linked to performance (Keate, 2015). One possible explanation is 
that incentives provided through compensation contracts lead to adverse effects on 
firm performance. Specifically, the inclusion of short-term focused, earnings-based 
performance measures in executive compensation can lead to earnings manipulation 
and therefore inaccurate firm performance (HassabElnaby et al., 2010; Ibrahim & 
Lloyd, 2011).  
Regulatory changes in the UK, starting with the Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992), 
have encouraged the use of a diverse set of performance measures in executive 
compensation. The 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2010) specifically advocates that performance-related measures should 
include non-financial metrics, where appropriate to promote the long-term success of the 
company. This paper examines how alternative performance measures in CEO bonus 
contracts, such as financial and non-financial measures, are associated with the 
manipulation of earnings through discretionary accruals and real activities 
management.   
When assessing reward-based compensation for executives, especially in bonus pay, 
appropriate performance measures must be chosen. These may be related to financial 
results of the company, non-financial factors, or a combination of both. Some of these 
are short-term focused, while others are more long-term focused. The use of non-
financial performance measures enable better strategic planning, giving investors a 
more accurate picture of the company’s overall performance (Ittner & Larcker, 2003). 
They also focus managers on the long-term and avoid the risk of managers making 
short-term decisions to increase their pay, at the expense of the longer-term success of 
the company (Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011).  
In this study, we use two alternatives to classify the diverse performance measures 
used in CEO bonus contracts. We first separate the performance measures into 
financial performance measures (hereafter, FPMs) and non-financial performance 
measures (hereafter, NFPMs) and propose that NFPMs will lead to fewer incentives 
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for earnings management. We also construct, through principal component analysis, 
two performance measurement factors; we interpret the first as a strategic, ‘long-term’ 
factor and the second as a ‘short-term’ financial-based factor. 
The information regarding the performance measures used is hand-collected from 
annual reports and particular attention is given to the weights attached to the 
alternative measures.  
We find evidence that when FPMs and NFPMs are both employed, less income-
increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals and expenses takes place.  
Furthermore, we find evidence that if equal or more weight is given to NFPMs, less 
earnings management takes place both through discretionary accruals and some real 
activities accounts. Furthermore, we find that when long-term measures are used, less 
income-increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals takes place. Some 
robustness tests are provided which are in line with the main results. 
This study contributes to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the executive 
compensation literature in that it further highlights the incentive effects of 
performance measures employed in CEO bonus contracts. We also provide 
comprehensive data on performance measures and weights used in these bonus 
contracts in a UK sample and how they have changed over time (2005-2014). In 
addition, given the detailed data we collect on performance measures, we provide a 
classification of these, using principal component analysis, into what can be 
interpreted as long-term and short-term measures which emphasises the two aspects 
of compensation. 
Second, it contributes to the earnings management literature by providing further 
evidence on both accrual and real activities management in a compensation setting 
that has not been studied before. The current study is based on a UK sample selected 
from the FTSE350 Index over the period 2005-2014. Similar studies examining 
earnings management related to performance measures only focus on US samples 
(e.g. HassabElnaby et al., 2010; Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011) and have only examined 
accrual management. However, recent studies on earnings management (e.g. Cohen 
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et al., 2008; Zang, 2012) find a shift to real activities management, especially after 
regulatory reforms such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US.  
The findings of the study are significant to shareholders, compensation committees 
and regulators in that they inform them of the importance of the choice of performance 
measures in incentivising managers. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the literature 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 provides the methodology, data collection, 
sample selection and explains the empirical models and variables used. Section 4 
presents the results and robustness tests, while section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
The Cadbury Report (Cadbury, 1992) first recommended that the performance 
measures used to assess executives’ compensation should be disclosed in company 
reports.  This was again stressed in the Greenbury Report (Greenbury, 1995) and was 
enforced by the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations in 2002 (DRRR, 2002) 
which required UK firms to disclose performance measures, targets and related 
benchmarks. These regulatory measures required firms to include details of 
performance-based pay such as bonuses and long-term pay. Some of this variable pay, 
especially bonuses, is linked to performance measures. Zakaria (2012) stresses the 
importance of firms having clear and concrete target guidelines relative to their own 
business; otherwise they tend to adopt other organisations’ policies (mimetic 
isomorphism). Although in the past most firms assessed performance for bonus 
compensation on year-to-date financial results, the recent trend is for firms to also use 
non-financial performance measures. For example, the 2014 BT Group Annual Report 
shows that the CEO received an annual bonus based on earnings per share, 
normalised free cash flows, revenue growth, customer service, environmental, social 
and governance measures and his personal contribution to company performance (BT 
Group PLC, 2014). The weight of each of these components in the bonus compensation 
is shown in Figure 1. 
-Figure 1- 
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Prior research examining the choice of performance measures in bonus contracts is 
scarce. An exception is Ittner et al. (1997) who examine a sample of firms that use only 
financial measures in their CEO bonus contracts, and those that report the weights 
placed on financial and non-financial measures. They find that firms that tend to use 
more non-financial performance measures are in more regulated industries and have 
more noisy measures of financial performance. Furthermore, firms that adopt 
strategic quality initiatives, and follow an innovation-oriented strategy, tend to adopt 
more non-financial performance measures in the CEO bonus contracts. This implies 
that firms that are more concerned with factors other than financial performance rely 
more heavily on non-financial performance measures in their incentive contracts. 
2.1 – Association of Earnings Management with Performance Measures  
Prior research on performance measures mainly examines the effect of the various 
measures on firm performance. Limited attention has been given to the influence of 
performance measures on earnings management. For example, some studies in the US 
find less earnings management, in the form of discretionary accruals, for firms using 
both financial and non-financial performance measures in bonus contracts 
(HassabElnaby et al., 2010; Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011). They argue that financial 
performance measures, which are predominantly used when determining cash 
bonuses in the US, encourage earnings management. They suggest that the use of 
NFPMs, coupled with FPMs provide fewer incentives to engage in income-increasing 
earnings management. Brazel et al. (2009) also find that when firms commit financial 
statement fraud to improve earnings, only financial measures have been used to assess 
performance.  
The benefits of including NFPMs in a Balanced Scorecard are discussed by Kaplan & 
Norton (2001) who list some of the most effective non-financial measures as customer 
satisfaction, product quality and ethical conduct. They argue that these give managers 
more information about the company’s operations, allow more effective changes to 
compensation systems, and reinforce strategic plans. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
NFPMs creates a higher level of performance management than using current 
financial measures alone (Neely & Al Najjar, 2006).  
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An important reason why NFPMs provide limited incentives for earnings 
management is that they are leading indicators of financial performance (Amir & Lev, 
1996; Banker et al., 2000). Hence, they focus managers on the long-term success of the 
firm, rather than being myopic and short-sighted (Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011). Evidence 
of this is found in studies showing NFPMs to be superior to financial measures as 
indicators of future financial performance (e.g. Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Nagar & Rajan, 
2005,). Banker et al. (2000) also show that NFPMs encourage executives to consider 
long-term performance rather than focusing on short-term objectives. Baiman & 
Baldenius (2009) find that NFPMs are an important tool in encouraging cooperation 
across company divisions. Executives who are paid bonuses linked to NFPMs 
improve project implementation efficiency and reduce upfront investment costs.  
Another advantage of using NFPMs is that they are harder to manipulate (Brazel et 
al. 2009). Additionally, many NFPMs are controlled by external factors such as 
environmental and political issues which are not capable of manipulation within the 
company. However, when NFPMs are subject to external factors, managers may either 
benefit or suffer costs from circumstances which are outside their control. For 
example, government intervention may influence performance measures related to 
strategic initiatives (e.g. a merger or acquisition), but this cannot be controlled by the 
CEO or the company. Similarly, environmental restrictions may impact 
environmental performance measures.   
The choice between alternative performance measures in bonus contracts is mainly 
dictated by industry type and surrounding factors (Hayes, 1977 and Otley, 1980). 
Bushman et al. (1996) and Said at al. (2003) stress the importance of tailoring the choice 
to find a match with firm characteristics. Such an alignment tends to enhance firm 
performance (Said et al. 2003).  
Based on the above discussion, the use of non-financial measures or measures that 
focus managers on the long-term is expected to be negatively associated with earnings 
management. This study examines the use of both financial (short-term) and non-
financial (long-term) performance measures in bonus contracts and the degree of 
earnings management by managers. We propose the following hypothesis: 
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H1: There will be less income-increasing earnings management by managers when 
performance is assessed by non-financial or long-term measures in bonus contracts, compared 
to when performance is measured by financial or short-term measures. 
Prior studies discussed above have tended to focus on earnings management in the 
form of accrual manipulation. However, in the US, recent studies on earnings 
management (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012) find a shift from accrual to real 
activities management following reforms introduced in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
aimed at strengthening governance in the US. Consistent with US studies, previous 
UK studies find lower accrual manipulation associated with governance mechanisms 
that would have been impacted by recent regulatory reforms e.g. Higgs Report (Higgs, 
2003) which made recommendations about board and ownership structure (Iqbal & 
Strong, 2010; Habbash et al., 2013a, 2013b). 
Furthermore, firms with incentives to manipulate earnings that face higher costs to do 
so through accrual manipulation may prefer to manage earnings through real 
activities (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010).1 This means that earnings management from 
incentives provided by bonus contracts can be achieved through either discretionary 
accruals, real activities management or both. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is tested through 
both accrual and real activities management. 
Our second hypothesis extends the argument by assessing the amount of earnings 
management based on the extent of use of the non-financial measures. When 
designing optimal compensation contracts, heavier weights placed on non-financial 
measures must be accompanied by a decreased weight on accounting income 
(Hemmer, 1996). Furthermore, there is evidence that firms use a higher weight on non-
financial measures when they are better indicators of future profitability (O’Connell 
& O’Sullivan, 2014). This suggests that firms should rely more on NFPMs and less on 
FPMs (Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011).      
                                                          
1 Costs of accrual manipulation examined in Cohen & Zarowin (2010) include cost of litigation and 




Dechow et al. (2011), examine firms with alleged misstatements of financial 
statements, and find that accruals and sales (financial measures) were abnormally 
high during misstatement years. Furthermore, the amount of earnings management 
decreases as the weighting of NFPMs increases (HassabElnaby et al., 2010; Ibrahim & 
Lloyd, 2011).     
Given the relative significance of NFPMs, we expect that the strong influence of these 
measures may inhibit managers from engaging in earnings management and 
therefore propose the following hypothesis:   
H2: There will be less income-increasing earnings management by managers when equal or 
more weight is placed on non-financial performance measures in bonus contracts. 
3 – Methodology 
3.1 – Sample Selection and Distribution 
The sample is chosen from the FTSE350 Index of firms with available data over the 
period 2005-2014. The choice of the year 2005 as the start of the sample relates to the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by listed firms in the 
UK. Therefore, all financial statements in the sample are prepared using IFRS.   
Firms in the financial sector are omitted, which is typical in research on executive 
compensation (e.g. Buck et al., 2003; Ozkan, 2011), as they have unique corporate 
governance rules and financial structure. In addition, firms with less than two years’ 
continuous presence in the FTSE350 Index are excluded, as are firms whose financial 
data are not disclosed and those where performance-measure data is not available. 
The final sample includes 188 firms and 1,588 firm year observations.2 Performance 
measure and corporate governance data are hand-collected from annual reports. We 
focus on the performance measures used in CEO bonus contracts given that long-term 
incentive pay is typically based on financial or return measures (Ibrahim & Lloyd, 
2011; KPMG, 2014). Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters are used to collect financial data 
                                                          
2 The firm-year observations include only those years where weights placed on performance measures 
are disclosed similar to Ittner et al. (1997). However, the results of hypothesis 1 hold in a broader sample 
where the types but not necessarily the weights of performance measures are disclosed. 
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to estimate proxies for earnings management and other control variables. The details 
of sample selection are summarised in Table 1.  
-Table 1 - 
Table 2 provides the industry distribution of firms based on the FTSE Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) introduced in 2005. The table shows that industrial 
and consumer services represent 56% of the sample, whereas utilities (3.15%) and 
telecommunications (3.27%) are at the lower end. Consumer goods represent 12.47% 
of the sample and the remainder of the industries range between 4.66% and 9.57%. 
The sample distribution is similar to that of the full FTSE350 index in year 2014, 
excluding financial firms.  
-Table 2- 
The performance measures used in CEO bonus contracts are hand-collected from the 
1,588 available annual reports. We collect information on the performance measure 
and weight used for each firm in the sample. Table 3 presents data on the use of non-
financial performance measures in the sample. From the table, we see that the 
percentage of firms that use non-financial measures in their CEO bonus contracts has 
increased from 48% in 2005 to 74% in 2014. Over the sample period, around 62% of 
the sample firms include non-financial performance measures. In terms of the weights 
used, the overall weight placed on NFPMs is not substantial, but has increased over 
time. On average, firms place 10% weight of their bonus compensation on NFPMs in 
2005 and this has increased gradually over the sample period to 18% in 2014. In the 
full sample, about 85% of the bonus contract is based on financial measures and 15% 
on non-financial measures. 
-Table 3- 
We categorise the performance measures into the following groups: a) Earnings 
measures (earnings per share, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA) or operating profit); b) Return on accounting measures (return 
on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) or return on capital employed (ROCE)); c) 
Operational Efficiency; d) Cash flows; e) Revenue growth; and f) Other financial 
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measures. These are all based on financial measures and therefore are termed FPMs. 
The remaining performance measures include: a) Customer-related factors; b) Safety 
and environment; c) Employee-related factors; d) Quality; e) Strategic factors; f) 
Individual factors; and g) Other qualitative factors. These are not financial in nature 
and therefore are termed NFPMs. Appendix 1 presents some examples of the 
categories of the performance measures. 
Panel A of table 4 shows the number of firms using the specific financial and non-
financial performance measures, together with average weights (the average of all 
individual weights within each category). It can be seen that the average weight of the 
earning measures in the overall bonus contract has somewhat declined from 72% in 
2005 to 56% in 2014. With regard to return on accounting measures, the number of 
firms using these measures has fluctuated, but the average weighting over the period 
has remained fairly constant. Although the percentage of firms using operational 
efficiency has fluctuated, the average weighting is consistent (less than a third). Cash 
flows is utilised by an increasing number of firms, but the average weighting has 
decreased over the ten years of the study (32% in 2005 to 20% in 2014). The use of 
revenue growth as a measure has increased between 2007 and 2014, although the 
average weighting has decreased over the last four years. Finally, other financial 
performance measures have been increasingly used and the average weighting, apart 
from 2005, has remained fairly constant.  
In terms of non-financial factors, customer-related factors have been increasingly used 
over the sample period and the weighting has also increased (from 17% in 2005 to 21% 
in 2014). The importance of safety and environment considerations is indicated by the 
rise in use, from 12 firms in 2005 to 28 in 2012-14. On the other hand, the average 
weighting has fallen from a high of 25% in 2005 to 14% in the final four years of the 
sample. Employee-related factors are given less emphasis and the average weighting 
has fallen to 10% in 2014. The quality of the product or service has the lowest priority 
with only one firm including it as a performance measure. However, the average 
weighting given to this element is consistently high at 25% for every year of the 
sample. The use of strategic factors, relating to such matters as business expansion, 
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has almost doubled over the period, although the average weighting has remained 
constant. Individual factors relate to qualities appropriate to the executive’s role in the 
company and an increasing number of firms in the sample use these as an important 
performance measure and apply an average weighting of 23%. The final column, 
headed ‘other qualitative’ relates to all the remaining NFPMs used by sample firms 
and shows a steady use with constant weighting, around 23%.      
-Table 4-   
Panel B of Table 4 shows the industry distribution of the use of FPMs and NFPMs. It 
can be seen that the industrial sector has the highest adoption in most areas of financial 
factors, perhaps because this is the largest sector represented in the FTSE350 Index. It 
is interesting that in the sample under review no industrial firm has used operational 
efficiency as a performance measure. However, a relatively large proportion of firms 
in this sector have used cash flows with an average weighting of 26%. Consumer 
Services rely heavily on earnings measures with an average weighting of 70%.  
In terms of non-financial factors, we find that relatively few firms use customer 
satisfaction and other customer-related factors, with the Consumer Goods, Consumer 
Services and Telecommunications industries being an exception. Safety and 
environment is seen as an important factor in the Utilities and Oil & Gas industries 
with a relatively high weighting. Only a few firms include employee-related factors 
as a performance measure, mostly in the Oil & Gas, Consumer Services and Utilities 
sectors. The strategic and individual factors are prominent in most industries and 
other qualitative measures are given high average weightings in Consumer Goods 
and Utilities (40%).                 
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3.2 – Variables Used and Empirical Models 
3.2.1 – Earnings Management Variables 
We use the Jones (1991) model with the Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) 
modifications to estimate proxies for discretionary accruals. Firstly, we estimate 
coefficients using the following regression: 
TACit = β0 + β1 �
1
Ait−1
� +  β2 �
∆REVit − ∆RECit
Ait−1
� + β3 �
PPEit
Ait−1
� + β4ROAit−1 + εit 
Where: 
TACit total accruals, calculated as the difference between income and cash 
from operations for firm i in year t, deflated by Ait-1; 
Ait-1 total assets of firm i at end of year t-1; 
ΔREVit  sales revenues of firm i in year t less sales revenues in year t-1; 
ΔRECit  accounts receivable of firm i in year t less accounts receivable in year 
t-1; 
PPEit  gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t; 
ROAit-1 ratio of net income to total assets for firm i in year t-1; 
εit the residual. 
The coefficients are estimated through industry-year regressions of the sample 
firm/year observations where industries are classified using the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) introduced by FTSE in 2005. The inclusion of prior 
year return on assets (ROA) in the above regression is proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) 
to control for the level of performance of firms.  Non-discretionary accruals are then 
estimated as follows: 
NDACit = β�0 +  β�1 �
1
Ait−1
� +  β�2 �
∆REVit − ∆RECit
Ait−1
� + β�3 �
PPEit
Ait−1
� + β�4ROAit−1 
Where NDACit represents the non-discretionary accruals of firm 𝑖𝑖 in year 𝑡𝑡, deflated by 
beginning total assets, and all other variables are as previously defined. 
Discretionary accruals are then measured as follows: 
DACit = TACit − NDACit     
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Where DACit is discretionary accruals for firm i in year t and all other variables are as 
previously defined. 
Earlier research on earnings management mainly concentrates on the use of 
discretionary accruals and pays little or no attention to real activities management 
when investigating the effectiveness of non-financial measures in constraining 
earnings management (e.g. HassabElnaby et al., 2010 and Ibrahim & Lloyd, 2011). Real 
activities management (hereafter, RAM), which involves manipulation of operating 
decisions, can be used more effectively to manipulate earnings, primarily because it is 
less easily detected. Examples of RAM include the adjustment of expenditure on 
research and development (hereafter, R&D) (Baber et al. 1991; Cheng, 2004) and the 
timing of sales of assets (Bartov, 1993; Herrmann et al. 2003). Overproduction and 
manipulation of sales can also be used to increase earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). Other methods involve taking credit for forward sales, 
rescheduling dates of shipments and reducing necessary maintenance expenses 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010). Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen & Zarowin (2010) we use 
three variables to investigate RAM related to abnormal cash from operations, 
discretionary expenditures and overproduction. 
Abnormal cash from operations result from temporary sales encouraged by generous 
price discounts or lenient credit terms (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen & Zarowin, 
2010); we use the following model to estimate firm-specific coefficients to measure 
abnormal cash from operations (ACFO):3 
CFOt =  β0 + β1 �
1
At−1
� + β2 �
REVt
At−1
� + β3 �
∆REVt
At−1
� + εt 
Where: 
CFOt cash from operations in year t, deflated by At-1; 
REVt sales revenue in year t; 
 All other variables are as previously defined. 
Discretionary expenditures include R&D, advertising and maintenance. These are 
usually charged in the period in which they are incurred, but earnings can be 
                                                          
3 We omit the i subscript for simplicity.  
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abnormally increased by reducing such expenditures (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010). The following model is used to estimate the coefficients to measure 
abnormal discretionary expenditures (ADISEXP): 
DISEXPt =  β0 + β1 �
1
At−1
� + β2 �
REVt−1
At−1
� + εt 
Where:   
DISEXPt discretionary expenses in year t, deflated by At-1; 
REVt-1 sales revenue in year t-1; 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
Overproduction involves producing more goods than necessary to service current and 
immediate future sales and it is used to spread fixed costs over a larger number of 
units, which has the effect of increasing earnings in the current period 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). The following model estimates 
coefficients used to measure abnormal production costs (APROD): 
PRODt =  β0 + β1 �
1
At−1
� + β2 �
REVt
At−1
� + β3 �
∆REVt
At−1
� + β4 �
∆REVt−1
At−1
� + εt 
Where: 
PRODt cost of goods sold in year t plus change in inventory in year t, 
deflated by At-1; 
ΔREVt-1 sales revenue in year t-1 less sales in year t-2; 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
The three measures of RAM: ACFO, ADISEXP, and APROD are the residuals from the 
above three regressions using CFOt, DISEXPt and PRODt as the dependent variables. 
A negative value for ACFO and ADISEXP as well as a positive value of APROD is in 
line with income-increasing manipulation (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
3.2.2 – Performance Measure Variables  
Prior surveys of directors’ compensation in the UK show that firms in the FTSE350 
index use multiple performance measures for bonus compensation including financial 
measures such as earnings per share and non-financial measures. On the other hand, 
equity-based compensation is mostly based on total shareholder returns and/or 
earnings per share measures (KPMG, 2014).  
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Our analysis is based on the use of non-financial as well as financial performance 
measures in only bonus compensation. Our first test variable, F&NFPM, is defined as 
follows: 
F&NFPM  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm uses NFPMs 
along with FPMs in CEO bonus contracts, and 0 otherwise. 
We also use principal component analysis (PCA) to group the performance measures 
into distinct categories. The purpose of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of a data 
set which consists of a large number of variables, that may be inter-related, by 
transforming them to a new set of variables or factors which are uncorrelated (Jolliffe, 
2002). We identify two discrete factors and using quartimax rotation, (orthogonal 
transformation of original factors – Jolliffe, 2002) are able to interpret the factors as a 
strategic, ‘long-term’ factor and a ‘short-term’ financial factor. The loadings on the 
rotated factors are presented in Table 5. 
-Table 5- 
As can be seen from Table 5, the performance measures that load heavily on factor 1 
are: customer-related factors (loading = 0.39) and employee-related factors (loading = 
0.33). These measures appear to be related to the long-term success of the firm (e.g. 
Ittner & Larcker, 1998) and so we term it ‘LONG-TERM’. We find that earnings 
measures load heavily on factor 2 (loading = 0.36); these are financial and are 
concerned with the short-term performance of the firm and we term this factor 
‘SHORT-TERM’. Therefore, we construct the following two factors as alternative 
classification of performance measures: 
LONG-TERM   Factor determined by principal component analysis with high 
loadings on customer-related factors and employee-related 
factors; 
SHORT-TERM  Factor determined by principal component analysis with high 
loading on earnings measures. 
 
Our final variable relates to the extent of use of non-financial performance measures 
in bonus compensation and is constructed as follows: 
High_NFPM  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the weight placed 
on NFPMs in CEO bonus contracts is equal to or greater than 
that placed on FPMs, and 0 otherwise.  
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In robustness tests, we also use the actual weights used by firms on NFPMs. 
3.2.3 – Empirical Research Models  
The following models are employed to test hypothesis 1: 
EMit = β0 + β1 F&NFPMit + β2 LTIPRit + β3 INSTOWNit + β4 BLOCKit + β5 CCINDit + β6 BSIZEit + β7 BINDit 
+ β8 DUALITYit + β9 AUDCINDit + β10 LEVit + β11 SIZEit + β12 GROWTHit + β13 CFOit + β14 ROAit + β15 REG 
+ β16 NON_EARN + β17 CRISISit + ∑ βk INDUSTRYit + εit    (1) 
EMit = β0 + β1 LONG-TERMit + β2 SHORT-TERMit + β3 LTIPRit + β4 INSTOWNit + β5 BLOCKit + β6 
CCINDit + β7 BSIZEit + β8 BINDit + β9 DUALITYit + β10 AUDCINDit + β11 LEVit + β12 SIZEit + β13 GROWTHit 
+ β14 CFOit + β15 ROAit + β16 REG + β17 NON_EARN + β18 CRISISit + ∑ βk INDUSTRYit + εit  
(2) 
We also use the following model to test hypothesis 2: 
EMit = β0 + β1 High_NFPMit  + β2 LTIPRit + β3 INSTOWNit + β4 BLOCKit + β5 CCINDit + β6 BSIZEit + β7 
BINDit + β8 DUALITYit + β9 AUDCINDit + β10 LEVit + β11 SIZEit + β12 GROWTHit + β13 CFOit + β14 ROAit + 
β15 REG + β16 NON_EARN + β17 CRISISit + ∑ βk INDUSTRYit + εit    (3) 
Where: 
EMit Earnings management variable for firm i in year t, including: DACit, 
ACFOit, ADISEXPit and APRODit; 
All other variables are defined in Appendix II. 
The test variables for hypothesis 1 are: F&NFPM, LONG-TERM, SHORT-TERM and 
for hypothesis 2, it is: High_NFPM. In line with the hypotheses, lower income-
increasing manipulation would be confirmed if the coefficient β1 in models 1 and 2 is 
negative for DAC and APROD but positive for ACFO and ADISEXP. For testing 
hypothesis 2, we expect the coefficient β1 in model 3 also to be negative for DAC and 
APROD but positive for ACFO and ADISEXP.  
We include the following control variables. First, we include the ratio of long-term 
incentive pay to total pay, LTIPR, given that incentives provided in long-term 
incentive pay differ from that in short-term pay. Prior research finds the use of 
discretionary accruals is higher in firms with higher equity incentives pay (Cheng & 
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Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006).4 On the other hand, firms with more 
long-term incentive plans have lower levels of earnings management (Richardson & 
Waegelein, 2002).  
We also include ownership variables representing institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN) and blockholder ownership (BLOCK) as they have a restraining effect on 
earnings management by monitoring executives’ behaviour (Hartzell & Starks, 2003). 
The monitoring effect is also controlled by the internal governance variables, 
compensation committee independence (CCIND), board size (BSIZE), board 
independence (BIND), CEO-chairman duality (DUALITY), and audit committee 
independence (AUDCIND) (e.g. see Schiehll & Bellavance, 2009 and Li et al, 2012). 
Firm performance is controlled by ROA and CFO and, following Dechow et al. (1995) 
and Healy & Wahlen (1999), leverage (LEV) is used as a proxy for debt covenant 
violation. In line with previous research, we use additional control variables such as 
firm size (SIZE) (Bartov, 1993) and growth prospects (GROWTH) (Carcello et al. 2006).  
We also include the variable, REG, to control for the effect of regulation in specific 
industries, which can incentivise earnings management (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
Regulated industries include the utilities and telecommunications industries, which 
tend to use more non-financial performance measures (Ittner et al., 1997) as well as 
the oil and gas industry (Hall, 1993). Furthermore, we include NON_EARN to proxy 
for the impact of financial performance measures other than earnings-based ones. For 
example, some firms include financial operational efficiency measures, cash flows or 
revenue growth, which are not expected to provide incentives to manage earnings. 
We also include CRISIS, which indicates the impact of the financial recession period 
on the level of accruals and other financial measures. Finally, we control for industry 
membership. 
                                                          
4 Cheng & Warfield (2005) measure equity incentives as the number of option grants, unexercisable 
options, exercisable options, restricted stock grants and ownership during or at the end of the year; 
Bergstresser & Philippon (2006) measure equity incentives through the dollar change in the value of a 
CEO’s stock and option holdings. Given that UK firms rarely make payments in the form of options, 
we focus on annual grants of shares and other long-term pay as reported in the annual report. 
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For all regressions, we calculate the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg statistic to check 
for heteroscedasticity. This tests the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals 
is constant. We find all p-values to be greater than 10% indicating no issues with 
heteroscedasticity. 
4 – Empirical Results 
4.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses. 
Discretionary accruals (DAC) and the three real activities management variables 
(ACFO, ADISEXP and APROD), as expected, all have a mean value of zero. Both DAC 
and APROD have positive median values, but ACFO and ADISEXP are both negative. 
This means that there is an income-increasing trend using all earnings management 
variables.  
-Table 6- 
Descriptive statistics for the main test variables show that 62% of firms in the sample 
use both FPM and NFPM (mean F&NFPM = 0.62). However, only 7% of the firms give 
equal or more weight to NFPM (mean High_NFPM = 0.07). The mean for both LONG-
TERM and SHORT-TERM factors are 0.00 but the range is larger for SHORT-TERM 
factors (minimum = -0.44 and -3.78 and maximum = 3.79 and 1.37 for LONG-TERM 
and SHORT-TERM, respectively). 
Institutional ownership is shown as 29%, which is consistent with prior research (e.g. 
22% by Peasnell et al., 2005; 29% by Ozkan, 2007). The blockholder statistics (BLOCK) 
indicate that 52% of shareholders in the sample firms have more than 10% ownership. 
Indicating high compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2010), compensation committee independence averages 96%. 
Average board size is low in the UK and the indicated figure of 9 is consistent to that 
found by other researchers (e.g. Beekes et al. 2004; Habbash et al. 2013b). The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2010) requires that at least 
50% of board members should be non-executives. The figure shown in the table is an 
average of 60%.           
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Although the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2010) 
states that no executive should hold dual positions in a company (e.g. CEO and 
Chairman), the sample includes 2% duality. This is because data from years prior to 
2010 is included. The code also sets out standards of good practice regarding audit 
committee independence and the sample shows 99% compliance with this. Even 
though the code is advisory, where firms have to ‘comply or explain’, most firms have 
chosen to comply with its requirements (e.g. MacNeil & Li, 2006; Arcot et al., 2010). 
Leverage is on average 60% which is similar to that found in prior studies (e.g. 49% in 
Ball & Shivakumar, 2004 and 57% in Kuang & Qin, 2009). In our sample, the mean 
value of size is 3.25. This is lower than the 8.26 found by Liang & Shan (2013). The 
growth variable (market-to-book-ratio) has a mean value of 4.81. Cash from 
operations (CFO) has a mean value of 0.13 which is more favourable than that shown 
by Peasnell et al. (2005) of –0.12. The mean value of 7.95 for return on assets (ROA) is 
higher than the figure of 6.13 found by Gregg et al. (2012).   
The regulated industries constitute 15% of the sample (mean REG is 0.15) and on 
average firms that use financial performance measures that are not related to earnings 
are 49% (mean NON_EARN is 0.49). Finally, about a third of the sample is within the 
financial crisis years (mean CRISIS is 0.30). 
4.2 – Results of Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 expects less income-increasing earnings management by executives 
when performance is assessed by both financial and non-financial measures. Table 7 
presents the coefficients (p-values) from model (1), using earnings management 
proxies as dependent variables. F&NFPM is the test variable representing firms’ usage 
of performance measures. As predicted by H1, the results suggest that when 
executives’ performance is assessed by both financial and non-financial performance 
measures, there is a lower level of discretionary accruals (coefficient of F&NFPM in 
column 1 is -0.004, p-value 0.02), indicating that executives engage in less income-
increasing manipulation when these two performance measures are in place. This is 
in line with the findings reported in Ibrahim & Lloyd (2011) in a US sample. 
Furthermore, the magnitude difference in the UK appears to be smaller (coefficient in 
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Ibrahim & Lloyd = -0.062 as compared to -0.004 in our study). Table 7 also shows a 
significant positive relationship between abnormal discretionary expenses and 
F&NFPM (coefficient 0.068 and p-value 0.03). This indicates that when firms employ 
both FPMs and NFPMs to appraise managers’ performance, there is less income-
increasing manipulation through the use of discretionary expenses. This may be 
because NFPMs are more closely related to long-term performance and therefore the 
current focus on earnings is lower. However, we do not find any significant evidence 
that other forms of real activities such as abnormal cash from operations (coefficient 
0.008 and p-value 0.99) and APROD (coefficient 0.007 and p-value 0.86) differ between 
firms that use only FPMs and those that use both FPMs and NFPMs to assess 
executives’ performance.  
We do not test for the substitute/complementarity effect of accrual and real activities 
management (e.g. Zang, 2012) but the evidence points to both accruals and 
discretionary expenses being used as mechanisms to manage earnings in firms that do 
not include non-financial performance measures in a complementary way. 
Furthermore, the time period in this study includes only years following regulatory 
reforms (e.g. Higgs, 2003) that may have caused a shift from accrual to real activities 
management. These findings have never been documented in prior research. 
Therefore, we conclude that earnings management incentives through both accrual 
and real activities management are lowered when firms employ non-financial 
performance measures in their CEO compensation.  
In terms of the control variables, the results in column 1 of Table 7, using DAC as 
dependent variable indicate that the only governance variable that is associated with 
discretionary accruals is the audit committee independence (AUDCIND) (coefficient  
0.041 and p value 0.07). Surprisingly, it does not appear to have a constraining effect. 
However, most firms have independent audit committees as can be seen in Table 6. 
Furthermore, firms with more growth prospects and higher performance have higher 
discretionary accruals (coefficient = 0.000, 0.001, and 0.000 for GROWTH, CFO, and 
ROA, respectively, significant at the 5%, 1% and 1% levels, respectively). We also find 
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that regulation (REG) and the inclusion of non-earnings financial performance 
measures (NON_EARN) are not associated with discretionary accruals. 
In the remaining columns of Table 7, we find that compensation committee 
independence, board size, firm size, firm performance and the non-earnings financial 
performance factors are associated with abnormal cash from operations. However, 
only firm performance and the financial crisis period variables are associated with 
abnormal discretionary expenses. 
-Table 7- 
Table 8 presents the results from model 2 including the factors: LONG-TERM and 
SHORT-TERM as test variables. We find that less income-increasing manipulation 
through accruals is associated with the use of long-term performance measures 
(coefficient on LONG-TERM in column 1 is -0.009 and p-value is 0.03), even after 
controlling for long-term incentive pay (coefficient on LTIPR is -0.014 and p-value is 
0.03). We do not find any consistent significant results for the real activities 
management variables. For example, ADISEXP is the expected sign (coefficient is 
0.008) and is close to significance (p-value is 0.18). However, ACFO is negative and 
significant (coefficient is -0.007 and p-value is 0.06) which indicates income-increasing 
behaviour. This could be an indication of a substitute effect between accrual and real 
activities management. We interpret our results as evidence that the long-term 
horizon effect of performance measures discourages earnings management behaviour 
only through discretionary accruals. There is no prior evidence on the horizon effect 
of bonus compensation on earnings management. However, Richardson & Waegelein 
(2002) show that firms that have long-term incentive plans in their total compensation 
have a lower incidence of earnings management, which is in line with the horizon 
effect. None of the coefficients of SHORT-TERM are significant in any of the 
regressions. 
With regard to control variables, column 1 of Table 8 shows that the only corporate 
governance variable that is associated with discretionary accruals is AUDCIND 
(coefficient = 0.056 and p-value 0.10), which suggests that it has no limiting effect on 
earnings management. In addition, GROWTH, CFO and ROA are all significant at the 
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1% level, showing that these variables are associated with higher discretionary 
accruals. No association is found between discretionary accruals and REG and 
NON_EARN. Finally, the association between crisis years (CRISIS) and discretionary 
accruals is significant at 1% (coefficient = 0.004, p value 0.00).  
We also find an association at varying levels of significance between ACFO, ADISEXP 
and APROD and several governance and other control variables such as CCIND, 
SIZE, and CFO.  
-Table 8- 
4.3 – Results of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 proposes that there is less income-increasing earnings management 
when performance is assessed by giving equal or more weight to non-financial 
performance measures. Table 9 presents the coefficients (p-values) from model (3) 
using earnings management proxies as the dependent variable. The results suggest 
that when the weight placed on NFPMs in CEO bonus contracts is equal to or greater 
than FPMs, executives engage in less income-increasing manipulation through 
discretionary accruals. There is a significant negative association between 
High_NFPM and discretionary accruals (coefficient -0.012 and p-value 0.02). This is in 
line with findings in HassabElnaby et al. (2010) in a US sample. However, the 
coefficient in our study (-0.012) is smaller than that found in the US (coefficient in 
HassabElnaby et al., 2010 is -0.046). No prior studies have documented the association 
between the use of weighted NFPMs in CEO bonus contracts and real activities 
management. 
-Table 9- 
Interestingly, the use of all three RAM techniques as dependent variables reveals that 
firms that give equal or higher weight to NFPMs in executive compensation contracts 
have lower real activities management in the form of abnormal discretionary expenses 
and overproduction but more income-increasing manipulation through abnormal 
cash from operations. The results indicate that there is a significant negative relation 
between High_NFPM and abnormal cash from operations (coefficient in column 2 for 
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High_NFPM is -0.009 and p-value 0.04). A significant positive association is found 
with regard to abnormal discretionary expenses and High_NFPM (coefficient 0.113 
and p-value 0.06). In addition, the results show that there is a marginally significant 
negative association between APROD and High_NFPM (coefficient -0.061 and p-value 
0.08).  
In terms of the control variables, column 1 shows that LTIPR is associated with 
discretionary accruals (coefficient = -0.012, p value = 0.04). The only corporate 
governance variable that is associated with discretionary accruals is AUDCIND 
(coefficient = 0.046 and p-value 0.10), which suggests that it has no limiting effect on 
earnings management. Variables associated with discretionary accruals are 
GROWTH, CFO and ROA, with significance levels of 10 %, 1% and 1% respectively.  
No association is found between discretionary accruals and REG, NON_EARN and 
CRISIS.  
The remaining three columns of Table 9 show that there is an association at varying 
levels of significance between LTIPR, INSTOWN, CCIND, SIZE, GROWTH, CFO and 
ACFO. Significant association at varying levels is found between LTIPR, CCIND, 
BIND, SIZE, CFO, ROA, NON_EARN and ADISEXP and there is also a significant 
association between LTIPR, DUALITY, LEV, SIZE, NON_EARN and APROD. 
Overall, the findings indicate that firms that place higher weights on non-financial 
performance measures have lower income-increasing accrual manipulation. We also 
find lower income-increasing real activities management through abnormal 
discretionary expenses and overproduction for firms that place more weight on non-
financial measures. This is in line with a complementary effect between accrual and 
real activities management. 
4.4 – Robustness Tests 
In this section, we provide results of robustness tests for both hypotheses. First, prior 
research on governance and firm performance indicate that both are inter-related (e.g. 
Wintoki et al., 2012). Therefore, tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 may be impacted by 
endogeneity in the regressions. Following the approach used by Coles et al. (2008) and 
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McKnight & Weir (2009), we use an instrumental variables (IV) two-stage regression 
(2SLS) analysis, using lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments. The 
following variables are regarded as endogenous: INSTOWN, BLOCK, CCIND, BSIZE, 
BIND, DUALITY and AUDCIND. The 2SLS results (Untabulated) are in line with the 
main results for both hypotheses. This indicates that the results do not appear to be 
affected by endogeneity. 
Second, we use an alternative measure of magnitude of reliance on non-financial 
performance measures to test hypothesis 2. Specifically, we use the actual weights 
placed on NFPMs. We construct the following variable: 
High_NFPM(W) Actual weight (percentage) placed on non-financial performance 
measures in CEO bonus contracts for firms that use these, and 0 
otherwise. 
The results, in Table 10, indicate that the higher the weight placed on NFPMs, the 
lower the level of income-increasing accrual manipulation (coefficient is -0.008, p-
value is 0.05), in line with the main results. There is also evidence of less income-
increasing real activities management through discretionary expenses (coefficient of 
ADISEXP is 0.005, p-value is 0.06) and overproduction (coefficient of APROD is -0.039, 
p-value is 0.10). However, we still find evidence of income-increasing real activities 
management using sales (coefficient of ACFO is -0.046, p-value is 0.06). The effect of 
the control variables is similar to that in the main tests. 
-Table 10- 
Our third robustness test examines the income-increasing vs. income-decreasing 
incentive effect of the bonus. Healy (1985) argues that when earnings are below the 
threshold for receiving any bonus, executives decrease current earnings to increase 
their chances of meeting targets for future years. Murphy & Jensen (2011) confirm 
these findings and add that executives may further reduce earnings by taking a big 
bath when the target bonus level is reached so that the target is not raised even higher 
for the next year. However, Holthausen et al. (1995) do not find any evidence that 
managers manipulate earnings downwards when the minimum target has not been 
reached. Given alternative incentives for income-increasing and income-decreasing 
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manipulation, following Bergstresser & Philippon (2006), we use the absolute values 
of discretionary accruals. We also use the absolute values of real activities 
management measures.  
The results in table 11 are in line with the main results of hypothesis 1 indicating that 
firms that use non-financial performance measures in their bonus compensation have 
lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals (coefficient of F&NFPM in column 1 is 
-0.014 and p-value is 0.01). We interpret this as evidence of lower incentives for 
earnings management when bonus contracts include non-financial performance 
measures. However, the absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenses are higher 
when firms rely on non-financial performance measures (coefficient of F&NFPM is 
0.156, p-value is 0.05), which is in not in line with lower earnings manipulation. 
-Table 11- 
The results of hypothesis 2 are also in line with the main results with respect to 
discretionary accruals. In table 12, we find that firms that rely more on non-financial 
performance measures in bonus compensation have lower levels of absolute 
discretionary accruals (coefficient of High_NFPM in column 1 is -0.042, p-value is 
0.03). We also find lower abnormal cash from operations (coefficient of High_NFPM 
in column 2 is -0.039, p-value is 0.05) and overproduction (coefficient is -0.099, p-value 
is 0.09), which is in line with less income manipulation. However, there is a higher 
level of abnormal discretionary expenses (coefficient is 0.096, p-value is 0.04). 
Therefore, the results are consistent with lower levels of income manipulation through 
accruals and some but not all real activities, when firms rely more on non-financial 
performance measures in their bonus contracts. 
-Table 12- 
5 – Conclusion 
This paper examines the importance of the choice of performance measures in CEO 
bonus contracts in constraining earnings management both through accruals and real 
activities management. Data on performance measures used in CEO bonus contracts 
is hand-collected from a sample of FTSE350 Index firms over the period 2005-2014. 
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Performance measures are classified as financial and non-financial measures with 
particular emphasis on the degree of weighting given to both FPMs and NFPMs. We 
find that less income-increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals and 
expenses takes place when FPMs and NFPMs are used together to assess executive 
performance. In addition, we find that if equal or more weight is given to NFPMs the 
amount of earnings management by discretionary accruals and real activities 
management through discretionary expenses and overproduction is lower.             
We also classify the performance measures using principal components analysis into 
two factors which are interpreted as: long-term and short-term factors. We find that 
the use of long-term factors is associated with less income-increasing manipulation 
through discretionary accruals. We present several robustness tests which provide 
similar results. 
Our research stresses the importance of including diverse performance measures to 
assess executive performance and we show that the use of a mix of FPMs and NFPMs 
as well as long-term and short-term measures is more effective and benefits all 
stakeholders. Our findings should be helpful to regulators in refining the present rules 
regarding the choice of performance measures. Compensation committees should also 
benefit from a recommendation that they should consider the importance of NFPMs 
and long-term performance measures in CEO bonus contracts when drafting 
executive compensation contracts.  
As with all research, the study has some limitations. Firstly, the sample is limited by 
the availability of relevant data regarding performance measures in company 
financial statements and reports. It would be useful if regulatory changes could make 
full disclosure mandatory, particularly with regard to FTSE350 Index firms. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to extend this study to smaller firms as the availability 
of data is even more restricted. In addition, the omission of financial companies means 
that the study is not fully representative of all FTSE350 Index companies.  
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Financial :    
Earnings  measures Measures related to 
earnings e.g. earnings per 
share, profit before tax, 
earnings before interest, tax 
and depreciation 
‘Financial measures (e.g. profit 
before tax) will represent the 
majority of bonus’ EasyJet, annual 
report 2013. (emphasis added)  
Operat ional  
ef f ic iency 
 
Measures related to efficient 
use of resources e.g. 
whether within budget or 
costs 
‘indicators of the full and effective 
use of resources.’ Royal Dutch Shell 
annual report, 2011. (emphasis 
added) 
Other  f inancial  
measures  
Financial-based measures 
that cannot be classified into 
any of the other financial 
categories or when financial 
measures are not clear 
‘26% based on strategic financial 
performance measures.’ Tesco plc 
annual report, 2013. (emphasis 
added) 
Non-financial :    
Customer-related 
factors 
Measures related to 
development of customer 
relations or satisfaction 
‘In 2007, the potential 100% cash 
bonus comprised … 20% to key 
business targets covering land, 
sales, customer service and Health 
and Safety.’ Redrow plc annual 
report, 2007. (emphasis added) 
Safety and 
environment 
Measures related to safety of 
employees or 
environmental factors 
‘reinforcing safety and risk 
management, and rebuilding trust’ 
BP plc annual report, 2010. 
(emphasis added) 
Strategic  factors Measures related to 
strategies of firm 
‘The performance measures for 
Executive Directors are based on a 
mix of …. non-financial goals as 
follows: R&D investment, 
Development of product 
portfolio, Succession Planning, 
Employee engagement, 
Compliance’ Smith and Nephew 
plc, annual report 2012. 
Other  quali tat ive  
factors 
Non-financial-based 
measures that cannot be 
classified into any of the 
other non-financial 
categories or when non-
financial measures are not 
clear 
‘annual targets were based on 
annual and three year increases in 
profit, earnings per share (EPS) 
growth, cash generation and 
certain non-financial targets’ 





Appendix II :  Definition of Variables  
Variable Symbol Definition 
Discretionary accruals  DAC Estimated by Jones (1991) model with the 
Dehow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) 
modifications  
Abnormal cash from 
operations 




ADISEXP Estimated by the Roychowdhury (2006) 
model  
Abnormal production costs APROD Estimated by the Roychowdhury (2006) 
model  
Financial and non-financial 
performance measures 
F&NFPM A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm uses NFPMs along with FPMs in CEO 
bonus contracts, and 0 otherwise 
Long-term performance 
measures 
LONG-TERM Factor determined by principal component 
analysis with high loadings on customer-
related factors and employee-related factors 
Short-term performance 
measures 
SHORT-TERM Factor determined by factor analysis with 
high loading on earnings measures 
Extent of use of non-financial 
performance measures  
High_NFPM A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the weight placed on NFPMs in CEO bonus 
contracts is equal to or greater than that placed 
on FPMs, and 0 otherwise 
Long-term incentive pay ratio LTIPR Value of long-term incentive pay divided by 
total pay, where long-term incentive pay 
includes value of pay through save-as-you-
earn plans, share-option plans, long-term- 
incentive plans and share-incentive plans 
during the year 
Institutional ownership  INSTOWN The number of shares held by the institutional 
investors divided by the issued number of 
shares by the company 
Blockholder ownership BLOCK A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the company has outside shareholders 
holding 10% or more of the company’s 
outstanding shares,  and 0 otherwise 
Compensation committee 
independence 
CCIND A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the compensation committee is exclusively 
composed of independent, non-executive 
directors, and 0 otherwise 
Board size BSIZE The number of directors on the board 
Board independence  BIND The proportion of independent, non-executive 
directors to the total number of board 
directors 
CEO-chairman duality DUALITY A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the positions of CEO and chairman are held by 
the same person, and 0 otherwise 
Audit committee 
independence 
AUDCIND The proportion of independent, non-executive 
directors on the audit committee to the total 
number of directors on the audit committee 
 35 
Leverage LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets 
Size SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets at year-
end 
Growth GROWTH Market-to-book-ratio 
Cash from operations CFO Cash from operations divided total assets at 
the beginning of the year 
Return on assets ROA Net income divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year 
Regulated industries REG A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the observation belongs to a firm in the 
following regulated industries: utilities, oil 




NON_EARN A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm includes financial performance 
measures other than earnings-based 
measures, and 0 otherwise 
Financial-crisis period CRISIS A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the data are from 2007-2009, and 0 otherwise 
Industry effect INDUSTRY Dummy variables to control for industry effect 
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Table 1: Sample Selection Criteria  
Description  Number of Firms 
Initial sample (FTSE350 as at 31st December 2014)  352 
Exclude:  
Financial Firms (112) 
Firms that do not have two years presence in FTSE350 (21) 
Firms that do not have three years of financial data  (10) 
Firms where performance measure data is not available  (21) 
Final Sample 188 
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Table 2: Industry Distribution of Sample 
Industry  Number of Firms 
Firm-Year 
Observations Percentage of Sample 
Oil & Gas 10 85 5.35% 
Basic Materials 17 152 9.57% 
Industrials 57 482 30.35% 
Consumer Goods 23 198 12.47% 
Health Care 9 82 5.16% 
Consumer Services 48 413 26.01% 
Telecommunications 7 52 3.27% 
Utilities 7 50 3.15% 
Technology 10 74 4.66% 
Full Sample 188 1,588 100.00% 
Industry sectors are determined using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) which was 









    Mean weight used 
Year Firm-year observations 
Percentage of 
firms with NFPM FPM NFPM 
2005 130 48% 90% 10% 
2006 135 49% 89% 11% 
2007 146 51% 87% 13% 
2008 148 51% 87% 13% 
2009 152 60% 85% 15% 
2010 161 61% 86% 14% 
2011 171 65% 85% 15% 
2012 177 72% 83% 17% 
2013 181 73% 82% 18% 
2014 187 74% 82% 18% 
Full sample 1,588 62% 85% 15% 
 
 
Table 4: Panel A: Yearly Distribution of Performance Measures  

































2005 126 72% 3 25% 7 29% 21 32% 13 33% 23 19% 
2006 131 73% 3 25% 8 25% 22 29% 13 32% 24 21% 
2007 142 71% 7 31% 9 24% 23 26% 13 34% 24 22% 
2008 144 69% 7 31% 8 25% 27 27% 14 34% 24 23% 
2009 148 65% 6 28% 9 26% 31 29% 16 30% 28 24% 
2010 157 65% 8 32% 11 28% 35 25% 19 32% 29 25% 
2011 167 63% 12 32% 12 29% 41 25% 21 28% 37 27% 
2012 173 59% 13 32% 11 26% 47 20% 25 28% 44 28% 
2013 177 57% 11 29% 11 26% 51 20% 31 28% 47 30% 
2014 183 56% 10 29% 9 29% 54 20% 34 28% 42 30% 
N 1,548  80  95  352  199  322  
 






































2005 5 17% 12 25% 3 20% 1 25% 24 31% 57 24% 10 24% 
2006 7 15% 14 23% 4 20% 1 25% 25 33% 58 23% 11 21% 
2007 8 18% 16 18% 4 20% 1 25% 29 32% 62 22% 11 22% 
2008 8 18% 14 16% 5 20% 1 25% 30 30% 61 22% 11 21% 
2009 9 16% 19 13% 7 15% 1 25% 31 29% 66 22% 12 23% 
2010 12 16% 21 13% 7 15% 1 25% 31 28% 64 22% 14 23% 
2011 15 13% 25 14% 8 15% 1 25% 32 29% 70 22% 15 23% 
2012 17 22% 28 14% 7 10% 1 25% 42 29% 75 23% 17 23% 
2013 17 21% 28 14% 7 10% 1 25% 45 27% 80 23% 15 23% 
2014 18 21% 28 14% 9 10% 1 25% 45 28% 78 23% 14 23% 





Panel B: Industrial Distribution of Performance Measures 

































Oil & Gas 61 52% 11 23% 40 37% 26 25% 11 21% 30 19% 
Basic Materials 136 56% 9 40% 30 30% 6 24% 0 0% 37 29% 
Industrials 487 69% 31 35% 0 0% 159 26% 28 26% 72 35% 
Consumer Goods 179 59% 24 25% 8 18% 63 24% 37 24% 45 58% 
Health Care 78 50% 0 0% 7 25% 14 18% 16 36% 32 14% 
Consumer Services 411 70% 5 33% 9 10% 38 17% 67 27% 64 21% 
Telecommunications 56 34% 0 0% 0 0% 32 27% 21 31% 5 23% 
Utilities 57 61% 0 0% 1 35% 8 21% 0 0% 4 20% 
Technology 83 57% 0 0% 0 0% 6 11% 19 39% 33 23% 
N 1,548  80  95  352  199  322  
 






































Oil & Gas 0 0% 52 21% 10 16% 0 0% 60 33% 33 30% 14 21% 
Basic Materials 5 18% 60 11% 0 0% 0 0% 55 44% 49 25% 5 22% 
Industrials 7 29% 21 9% 0 0% 10 25% 85 22% 213 22% 26 8% 
Consumer Goods 29 15% 19 16% 7 15% 0 0% 37 25% 51 23% 10 40% 
Health Care 8 15% 0 0% 9 19% 0 0% 19 27% 53 19% 13 20% 
Consumer Services 29 12% 16 14% 11 10% 0 0% 58 27% 166 22% 63 11% 
Telecommunications 24 21% 6 12% 8 12% 0 0% 14 26% 28 32% 0 0% 
Utilities 13 32% 23 20% 16 16% 0 0% 8 30% 40 20% 9 40% 
Technology 1 10% 8 17% 0 0% 0 0% 18 23% 38 18% 0 0% 
N 116  205  61  10  334  671  130  
*Earnings measures include earnings per share (EPS), earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) and operating profit. 
**Return on accounting measures include return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and return on capital employed (ROCE). 
 
 
Table 5:  Factor Loadings using Principal Component Analysis 
(N=1,588) 
Performance Measure  Factor 1  Factor 2  
Customer-related Factors 0.390 0.137 
Employee-related Factors 0.330 0.081 
Operational Efficiency 0.204 -0.199 
Safety and Environment 0.143 -0.163 
Other Qualitative 0.008 0.005 
Earnings Measures -0.041 0.355 
Return on Accounting Measures 0.016 0.048 
Quality 0.025 0.047 
Revenue Growth 0.000 -0.072 
Cash flows 0.042 -0.079 
Individual Factors -0.023 -0.094 
Strategic Factors 0.009 -0.165 









Table 6: Descriptive Statistics  
(N = 1,588) 
Variable  Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. 
DAC  0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.45 0.38 
ACFO  0.00 -0.01 0.07 -0.46 0.40 
ADISEXP  0.00 -0.07 0.37 -1.20 1.78 
APROD  0.00 0.02 0.42 -2.05 1.84 
F&NFPM 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LONG-TERM 0.00 -0.28 0.75 -0.44 3.79 
SHORT-TERM 0.00 0.17 0.68 -3.78 1.37 
High_NFPM 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 
LTIPR 0.29 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.91 
INSTOWN 0.29 0.28 0.16 0.00 0.72 
BLOCK 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
CCIND 0.96 1.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 
BSIZE  8.99 9.00 2.32 5.00 16.00 
BIND 0.60 0.60 0.12 0.00 1.00 
DUALITY 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 
AUDCIND 0.99 1.00 0.08 0.00 1.00 
LEV 0.60 0.61 0.21 0.01 0.77 
SIZE  3.25 3.21 0.67 1.71 5.20 
GROWTH  4.81 2.74 9.62 0.00 44.30 
CFO 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.61 
ROA  7.95 6.77 10.39 -6.42 17.44 
REG 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
NON_EARN 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
CRISIS 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 




Table 7: Regression Results of Earnings Management Variables and Use of NFPMs 
and FPMs  
(N=1,588) 
  Accrual-based EM Real Activities-based EM 
 Expected Sign DAC ACFO ADISEXP APROD 
F&NFPM `+ / - -0.004 0.008 0.068 0.007 
  (0.019)** (0.992) (0.026)** (0.859) 
LTIPR `+ / - -0.005 -0.005 0.005 -0.009 
  (0.232) (0.569) (0.946) (0.863) 
INSTOWN `- 0.023 -0.041 0.151 -0.028 
  (0.411) (0.236) (0.115) (0.856) 
BLOCK `- -0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.007 
  (0.546) (0.572) (0.962) (0.679) 
CCIND `- -0.006 -0.021 0.033 -0.031 
  (0.256) (0.018)** (0.654) (0.619) 
BSIZE `- 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 
  (0.656) (0.079)* (0.772) (0.716) 
BIND `- 0.004 -0.007 -0.004 0.006 
  (0.932) (0.523) (0.957) (0.938) 
DUALITY `- 0.002 -0.014 -0.018 -0.049 
  (0.851) (0.323) (0.271) (0.541) 
AUDCIND `- 0.041 0.026 -0.162 0.079 
  (0.072)* (0.636) (0.256) (0.733) 
LEV `+ / - 0.003 -0.004 -0.019 0.041 
  (0.636) (0.642) (0.716) (0.549) 
SIZE `+ / - 0.000 -0.004 0.016 0.002 
  (0.723) (0.061)* (0.341) (0.915) 
GROWTH `+ / - 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
  (0.049)** (0.101) (0.856) (0.639) 
CFO `+ / - 0.001 0.006 0.063 0.069 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.649) 
ROA `+ / - 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.211) 
REG `+ / - -0.001 -0.002 0.021 -0.019 
  (0.622) (0.659) (0.310) (0.622) 
NON_EARN `+ / - -0.001 -0.049 -0.026 -0.001 
  (0.829) (0.083)* (0.731) (0.941) 
CRISIS `+ / - -0.016 0.005 0.036 -0.036 
  (0.103) (0.136) (0.086)* (0.309) 
_cons  -0.047 0.051 0.071 -0.051 
  (0.266) (0.129) (0.722) (0.749) 
INDUSTRY   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  27.42% 33.29% 19.29% 7.56% 
Wald Chi2  542.29*** 869.34*** 156.42*** 36.49* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 




Table 8:  Regression Results of Earnings Management Variables and Use of Long-term 
and Short-term Factors 
(N=1,588) 
  Accrual-based EM Real Activities-based EM 
 Expected Sign DAC ACFO ADISEXP APROD 
LONG-TERM `+ / - -0.009 -0.007 0.008 -0.011 
  (0.031)** (0.062)* (0.182) (0.232) 
SHORT-TERM `+ / - 0.005 -0.006 0.022 -0.025 
  (0.263) (0.333) (0.556) (0.243) 
LTIPR `+ / - -0.014 -0.007 0.009 -0.014 
  (0.031)** (0.077)* (0.911) (0.824) 
INSTOWN `- -0.005 -0.024 0.072 -0.016 
  (0.726) (0.079)* (0.265) (0.432) 
BLOCK `- 0.004 -0.007 0.010 -0.008 
  (0.511) (0.522) (0.078)* (0.644) 
CCIND `- -0.006 -0.026 0.021 -0.021 
  (0.236) (0.011)** (0.057)* (0.653) 
BSIZE `- 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 
  (0.796) (0.623) (0.781) (0.751) 
BIND `- 0.004 -0.016 -0.012 -0.003 
  (0.869) (0.456) (0.054)* (0.984) 
DUALITY `- -0.004 -0.018 -0.007 -0.055 
  (0.772) (0.047)** (0.912) (0.053)* 
AUDCIND `- 0.056 0.016 -0.175 -0.022 
  (0.097)* (0.723) (0.346) (0.561) 
LEV `+ / - 0.006 -0.006 -0.023 0.031 
  (0.686) (0.641) (0.718) (0.057)* 
SIZE `+ / - -0.003 -0.006 0.021 0.003 
  (0.911) (0.065)* (0.000)*** (0.006)*** 
GROWTH `+ / - -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.002 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.823) (0.651) 
CFO `+ / - 0.003 0.008 -0.034 0.526 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.081)* 
ROA `+ / - 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.241) (0.000)*** (0.003)*** 
REG `+ / - 0.004 -0.004 0.023 -0.012 
  (0.526) (0.512) (0.322) (0.252) 
NON_EARN `+ / - -0.003 -0.008 0.071 -0.096 
  (0.149) (0.086)* (0.456) (0.351) 
CRISIS `+ / - 0.004 0.006 0.041 -0.031 
  (0.000)*** (0.172) (0.136) (0.332) 
Intercept  -0.045 0.033 0.079 -0.032 
  (0.013)** (0.000)*** (0.586) (0.132) 
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  17.45% 19.23% 11.29% 11.16% 
Wald Chi2  26.11** 31.42** 17.42* 8.56* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 





Table 9:  Regression Results of Earnings Management Variables and Extent of Use of 
NFPMs 
(N=1,588) 
  Accrual-based EM Real Activities-based EM 
 
Expected 
Sign DAC ACFO ADISEXP APROD 
High_NFPM `+ / - -0.012 -0.009 0.113 -0.061 
  (0.018)** (0.041)** (0.056)* (0.081)* 
LTIPR `+ / - -0.012 -0.006 0.005 -0.010 
  (0.041)** (0.051)* (0.096)* (0.095)* 
INSTOWN `- -0.002 -0.026 0.056 -0.046 
  (0.962) (0.075)* (0.156) (0.586) 
BLOCK `- 0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.006 
  (0.565) (0.541) (0.112) (0.712) 
CCIND `- -0.011 -0.036 0.046 -0.036 
  (0.246) (0.023)** (0.031)** (0.623) 
BSIZE `- -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.623) (0.562) (0.685) (0.656) 
BIND `- 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.861) (0.581) (0.051)* (0.966) 
DUALITY `- -0.002 -0.016 -0.014 -0.051 
  (0.827) (0.354) (0.862) (0.026)** 
AUDCIND `- 0.046 0.014 -0.188 0.085 
  (0.097)* (0.675) (0.312) (0.681) 
LEV `+ / - 0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.086 
  (0.621) (0.672) (0.876) (0.012)** 
SIZE `+ / - -0.002 -0.005 0.018 0.004 
  (0.836) (0.056)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
GROWTH `+ / - -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.076)* (0.091)* (0.863) (0.681) 
CFO `+ / - -0.001 0.006 -0.052 -0.056 
  (0.000)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.114) 
ROA `+ / - 0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.004 
  (0.000)*** (0.223) (0.002)*** (0.235) 
REG `+ / - 0.002 -0.002 0.031 -0.015 
  (0.516) (0.662) (0.341) (0.561) 
NON_EARN `+ / - -0.012 -0.026 -0.027 -0.003 
  (0.126) (0.123) (0.092)* (0.061)* 
CRISIS `+ / - -0.005 0.006 0.056 -0.026 
  (0.311) (0.176) (0.134) (0.333) 
Intercept  -0.043 0.456 0.071 -0.046 
  (0.156) (0.156) (0.629) (0.856) 
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  53.11% 32.33% 24.56% 13.11% 
Wald Chi2  823.11*** 476.61*** 156.31** 46.11* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 







Table 10: Regression results of Earnings Management Variables and Extent of Use 
of NFPMs using actual weights 
(N=1,588) 
  Accrual-based EM Real Activities-based EM 
 
Expected 
Sign DAC ACFO ADISEXP APROD 
High_NFPM (W) `+ / - -0.008 -0.046 0.005 -0.039 
  (0.049)** (0.059)* (0.061)* (0.096)* 
LTIPR `+ / - -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 
  (0.026)** (0.032)** (0.091)* (0.061)* 
INSTOWN `- 0.054 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.091)* (0.256) (0.065)* (0.439) 
BLOCK `- 0.000 -0.035 0.134 -0.006 
  (0.096)* (0.469) (0.046)** (0.134) 
CCIND `- -0.045 -0.021 0.135 0.042 
  (0.135) (0.542) (0.034)** (0.359) 
BSIZE `- -0.009 -0.012 -0.002 0.046 
  (0.043)** (0.136) (0.212) (0.281) 
BIND `- -0.116 0.036 0.156 0.231 
  (0.016)** (0.542) (0.063)* (0.256) 
DUALITY `- -0.015 -0.004 -0.021 0.326 
  (0.231) (0.023)** (0.521) (0.010)*** 
AUDCIND `- -0.055 0.546 0.342 -0.146 
  (0.236) (0.186) (0.352) (0.352) 
LEV `+ / - -0.016 -0.096 0.036 0.156 
  (0.263) (0.143) (0.325) (0.033)** 
SIZE `+ / - 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
GROWTH `+ / - 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.031)** (0.210) 
CFO `+ / - 0.126 0.279 0.549 0.263 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.052)* 
ROA `+ / - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000)*** (0.067)* (0.000)*** (0.151) 
REG `+ / - 0.002 -0.000 0.016 -0.015 
  (0.242) (0.279) (0.244) (0.566) 
NON_EARN `+ / - -0.023 -0.017 -0.036 -0.002 
  (0.096)* (0.121) (0.081)* (0.082)* 
CRISIS `+ / - 0.023 -0.025 -0.006 -0.016 
  (0.001)*** (0.127) (0.526) (0.636) 
_cons  0.256 -0.132 -0.291 0.338 
  (0.055)* (0.000)*** (0.112) (0.216) 
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  53.36% 38.27% 31.42% 11.37% 
Wald Chi2  751.23*** 554.49*** 156.39* 42.26* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
High_NFPM (W) is the actual weight (percentage) placed on non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus 
contracts for firms that use these, and 0 otherwise. 






Table 11: Regression Results of Absolute Values of Earnings Management Variables and 
Use of NFPMs and FPMs  
(N=1,588) 
  Accrual-based EM Real Activities-based EM 
 
Expected 
Sign Abs(DAC) Abs(ACFO) Abs(ADISEXP) Abs(APROD) 
F&NFPM `+ / - -0.014 0.006 0.156 0.044 
  (0.012)** (0.756) (0.052)* (0.857) 
LTIPR `+ / - -0.007 -0.001 0.004 -0.029 
  (0.351) (0.676) (0.771) (0.849) 
INSTOWN `- 0.032 -0.020 0.150 -0.029 
  (0.532) (0.242) (0.141) (0.872) 
BLOCK `- -0.004 -0.004 0.003 -0.006 
  (0.519) (0.539) (0.952) (0.637) 
CCIND `- -0.004 -0.021 0.022 -0.032 
  (0.219) (0.012)** (0.649) (0.621) 
BSIZE `- 0.003 -0.007 0.004 -0.003 
  (0.659) (0.090)* (0.771) (0.742) 
BIND `- 0.003 -0.011 -0.003 0.008 
  (0.851) (0.516) (0.931) (0.956) 
DUALITY `- 0.003 -0.014 -0.069 -0.051 
  (0.845) (0.320) (0.259) (0.549) 
AUDCIND `- 0.049 0.011 -0.251 0.071 
  (0.087)* (0.746) (0.180) (0.755) 
LEV `+ / - 0.002 -0.004 -0.020 0.049 
  (0.564) (0.611) (0.711) (0.581) 
SIZE `+ / - 0.002 -0.003 0.040 0.003 
  (0.656) (0.056)* (0.332) (0.942) 
GROWTH `+ / - 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.050)** (0.152) (0.851) (0.639) 
CFO `+ / - 0.009 0.004 0.044 0.081 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.679) 
ROA `+ / - 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.271) 
REG `+ / - -0.004 -0.004 0.019 -0.014 
  (0.662) (0.652) (0.251) (0.661) 
NON_EARN `+ / - -0.021 -0.051 -0.044 -0.002 
  (0.133) (0.087)* (0.751) (0.924) 
CRISIS `+ / - -0.043 0.004 0.050 -0.051 
  (0.139) (0.268) (0.067)* (0.331) 
_cons  -0.031 0.056 0.062 -0.072 
  (0.256) (0.163) (0.737) (0.751) 
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  45.39% 53.59% 19.29% 8.56% 
Wald Chi2  467.72*** 732.32*** 188.56*** 26.21* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Abs(DAC), Abs(ACFO), Abs(ADISEXP), and Abs(APROD) are absolute values of DAC, ACFO, ADISEXP, and 
APROD, respectively. 





Table 12:  Regression results of Absolute Values of Earnings Management Variables and 
Extent of Use of NFPMs  
(N=1,588) 
  Accrual-based EM Real Activities-based EM 
 
Expected 
Sign Abs(DAC) Abs(ACFO) Abs(ADISEXP) Abs(APROD) 
High_NFPM `+ / - -0.042 -0.039 0.096 -0.099 
  (0.029)** (0.051)* (0.044)** (0.089)* 
LTIPR `+ / - -0.007 -0.009 0.004 -0.009 
  (0.063)* (0.066)* (0.089)* (0.069)* 
INSTOWN `- -0.001 -0.046 0.086 -0.066 
  (0.956) (0.089)* (0.139) (0.712) 
BLOCK `- 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.016 
  (0.579) (0.582) (0.121) (0.762) 
RMUCIND `- -0.016 -0.046 0.056 -0.072 
  (0.281) (0.026)** (0.046)** (0.739) 
BSIZE `- -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.656) (0.562) (0.656) (0.744) 
BIND `- 0.001 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 
  (0.926) (0.571) (0.052)* (0.839) 
DUALITY `- -0.002 -0.029 -0.016 -0.076 
  (0.851) (0.336) (0.852) (0.061)* 
AUDCIND `- 0.036 0.016 -0.186 0.022 
  (0.091)* (0.671) (0.352) (0.739) 
LEV `+ / - 0.001 -0.005 -0.009 0.086 
  (0.632) (0.663) (0.862) (0.010)*** 
SIZE `+ / - -0.000 -0.006 0.036 0.002 
  (0.851) (0.072)* (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
GROWTH `+ / - -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.076)* (0.089)* (0.856) (0.712) 
CFO `+ / - -0.000 0.005 -0.052 -0.066 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.112) 
ROA `+ / - 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.000)*** (0.234) (0.000)*** (0.329) 
REG `+ / - 0.002 -0.002 0.034 -0.016 
  (0.556) (0.656) (0.352) (0.634) 
NON_EARN `+ / - -0.016 -0.051 -0.045 -0.003 
  (0.125) (0.236) (0.136) (0.156) 
CRISIS `+ / - -0.004 0.005 0.052 -0.036 
  (0.336) (0.175) (0.163) (0.459) 
Intercept  -0.036 0.436 0.053 -0.036 
  (0.156) (0.196) (0.652) (0.734) 
INDUSTRY  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  53.51% 42.39% 25.36% 09.10% 
Wald Chi2  923.29*** 526.33*** 223.96** 83.25* 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Abs(DAC), Abs(ACFO), Abs(ADISEXP), and Abs(APROD) are absolute values of DAC, ACFO, ADISEXP, and 
APROD, respectively. 
Definitions of all variables can be found in appendix II. 
 
 
 
